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PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN THE AGE OF 
THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
NICOLE SMITH† 
“Wake up, baby!”1 
Imagine waking up in the middle of the night to the sound of 
a stranger speaking to your baby through the baby monitor.  For 
one Texas couple, this horror story became reality when a man 
hacked their internet-connected monitors to watch and stalk 
their child.2  In a similarly horrifying scenario, a hacker stalked 
Miss Teen USA, Cassidy Wolf, for a year via her webcam.3  The 
stalker had 24/7 access to her webcam and also traced the 
keystrokes on her keyboard to learn her passwords for various 
web accounts.4  Subsequently, the hacker used private 
information he learned about her from those accounts to 
blackmail her into doing whatever he wanted.5  Unfortunately, as 
the amount of technology in use increases, frightening stories 
like these become more common.  It is not difficult to envision a 
scenario in which hackers can gain access to financial 
information, medical records, and other critical private 
information.  In light of ever increasing technological advances, 
Congress must respond by enacting legislation that addresses the 
specific security and privacy concerns that internet-connected 
technology presents. 
 
† Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2020, St. John’s 
University School of Law. The author would like to extend her gratitutude to the 
members and editors of the St. John’s Law Review for their dedication and hard 
work throughout the publication process. She would also like to thank her soon-to-be 
husband and her family for their unwavering support and encouragement. 
1 Home, Hacked Home: The Perils of Connected Devices, ECONOMIST (July 10, 
2014), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2014/07/12/home-hacked-home. 
2 Id. 
3 Cassidy Wolf, Miss Teen USA Lived Through Your Worst Hacking 
Nightmare—Hear Her Frightening Story, TEEN VOGUE (Nov. 8, 2013), 
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/cassidy-wolf-hacking. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
A. Definition and Scope of the Internet of Things 
The term Internet of Things (“IoT”), also sometimes called 
the Internet of Everything, was first coined in 2005 and has since 
been defined in many ways.6  The Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC” or the “Commission”) recently defined it as any device or 
sensor that can “connect, communicate or transmit information 
with or between each other through the Internet” excluding 
“computers, smartphones, or tablets.”7  A contributing writer for 
Forbes defined it more simply as “the concept of basically 
connecting any device with an on and off switch to the Internet 
(and/or to each other).”8  Further, Merriam-Webster places a 
higher emphasis on the devices’ connectivity with each other, 
defining it as “the networking capability that allows information 
to be sent to and received from objects and devices (such as 
fixtures and kitchen appliances) using the Internet.”9 
Regardless of the precise definition, the number of IoT 
devices is rapidly increasing, especially among consumers.10   
In 2017, Gartner, Inc. predicted that the number of IoT devices in 
use would rise from 8.4 billion to 20.4 billion by  
2020.11  Furthermore, Gartner claimed that devices used by 
consumers—as opposed to businesses—make up 63% of total 
devices used.12  Additionally, Gartner estimated that consumers 
 
6 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 5 (2015). 
7 Id. at 6. 
8 Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things’, FORBES (May 
13, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-
internet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/#b55789b1d091. 
9 Internet of Things, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/Internet%20of%20Things (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). 
10 Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Raising the 
Standard: Bringing Security and Transparency to the Internet of Things?  
(July 26, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/ 
1395854/slaughter_-_raising_the_standard_-_bringing_security_and_transparency_ 
to_the_internet_of_things_7-26.pdf; see also Gartner Says 8.4 Billion Connected 
“Things” Will Be in Use in 2017, Up 31 Percent From 2016, GARTNER (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2017-02-07-gartner-says-8-
billion-connected-things-will-be-in-use-in-2017-up-31-percent-from-2016 [hereinafter 
Gartner] (finding that consumer application represented 63% of IoT applications  
in 2017). 
11 Gartner, supra note 10. 
12 Id. 
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and businesses would spend $2 trillion on IoT devices in 2017,13 
and it predicts that number will rise to $3 trillion in  
2020.14  These data demonstrate how much we already rely on  
IoT devices, and they will only become a more integral part of  
our lives. 
B. Examples of IoT Devices 
Several different categories of devices make up the IoT.  
Common categories include health and fitness sensors, home 
appliances, automobile sensors, and employee sensors.15  Each 
type of sensor will be discussed in turn. 
1. Health and Fitness Sensors 
Consumers and health care providers use health and fitness 
sensors to track behavior, changes in health, and other 
information such as vital signs.  Categories of health and fitness 
sensors include: 
(1) countertop devices (such as a blood-pressure monitor or 
weight scale); (2) wearable sensors (such as an arm or wrist 
band); (3) intimate contact sensors (such as a patch or electronic 
tattoo); (4) ingestible sensors (such as an electronic pill); and 
(5) implantable sensors (such as a heart or blood health 
monitor).16 
Wearable sensors and implantable sensors are discussed in more 
detail below.  
Wearable devices are “devices that can be worn or mated 
with human skin to continuously and closely monitor an 
individual’s activities, without interrupting or limiting the user’s 
motions.”17  Popular examples of these devices include the Fitbit 
 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward 
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 98 
(2014) (breaking down the internet of things into several categories, including  
health and fitness sensors, automobile sensors, home and electricity sensors, and 
employee sensors). 
16 Id. at 98–99. 
17 Mostafa Haghi et al., Wearable Devices in Medical Internet of Things: 
Scientific Research and Commercially Available Devices, 23 HEALTHCARE 
INFORMATICS RES. 4, 4–5 (2017). 
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and the Apple Watch.18  Generally, users wear these devices on 
their wrists to track several health indicators such as footsteps, 
heart rate, sleeping patterns, calories burned, and more.19  The 
devices can also analyze these data and provide advice to users 
on ways to improve their health.20  In the past decade, wearable 
devices have become increasingly popular.21  In fact, a 2016 study 
showed that 17% of Americans over the age of 65 and 20% of 
Americans under the age of 65 used wearable devices.22 
Additionally, implantable sensors are an integral part of our 
health care system.  One example of an important 
internet-connected medical device is the pacemaker.23  The 
implantable pacemaker monitors and assesses the performance 
of a person’s heart and automatically transmits that data to a 
doctor for review.24  Another example is the cardioverter 
defibrillator, which detects abnormalities in a patient’s heartbeat 
and automatically sends an electric shock to restart the heart if 
needed.25  Like the pacemaker, the cardioverter defibrillator also 
stores and transmits important heart-health data for a doctor’s 
review.26  The importance of implantable connected devices that  
 
 
 
18 FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/home (last visited Sept. 20, 2019); Apple  
Watch Series 4, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/apple-watch-series-4/ (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2019). 
19 Our Technology, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/technology (last visited Sept. 
20, 2019); Apple Watch Series 4 – Health & ECG, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/ 
apple-watch-series-4/health/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2019). 
20 Our Technology, supra note 19; Apple Watch Series 4 – Health & ECG, supra 
note 19. 
21 See Haghi et al., supra note 17, at 4. 
22 Bruce Japsen, Wearable Fitness Devices Attract More Than the Young and 
Healthy, FORBES (July 11, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2016/07/ 
11/wearable-fitness-devices-attract-more-than-young-healthy/#244b67e957df. 
23 Molika Ashford, First Internet-Connected Pacemaker Successfully  
Implanted, POPULAR SCI. (Aug. 11, 2009), https://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/ 
2009-08/first-patient-implanted-pacemaker-communicates-wirelessly-her-doctor. 
The first internet-connected pacemaker was implanted in 2009. Id. The device 
communicates with the doctor, so the doctor will be aware of any irregularities and 
will be able to act quickly to remedy them. Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator, AM. HEART ASS’N, http://www.heart. 
org/en/health-topics/arrhythmia/prevention--treatment-of-arrhythmia/implantable-
cardioverter-defibrillator-icd (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). 
26 Id. 
2019]	 PROTECTING	CONSUMERS	 855	
collect health data will only continue to grow.27  As this 
technology becomes more commonplace, it will be crucial to 
protect the sensitive data that these devices collect. 
2. Home Appliances 
Internet-connected home appliances are also constantly 
expanding in number.  Amazon Web Services has divided 
internet-connected home devices into three categories: home 
automation, home security and monitoring, and home 
networking.28  The most popular examples of home appliance 
devices in use today include Amazon’s Alexa, Samsung’s Family 
Hub smart refrigerator, and the Nest Thermostat.  Alexa, an 
example of a home automation device, assists users by answering 
questions, reporting the news, and playing music.29  Most 
impressively, Alexa can control other appliances in the home via 
internet connection, such as lightbulbs.30  Further, Samsung’s 
smart refrigerator is also a home automation device.31  Through 
an application, users can view the inside of the refrigerator on 
the go to take note of its contents.32  The refrigerator can also 
create shopping lists and display recipes.33  Next, the Nest 
Learning Thermostat is a multifaceted device that uses 
self-programming technology to monitor and change the 
temperature of the home.34  It also acts as a home security 
system by sending the consumer digital alerts if it detects smoke, 
carbon monoxide, or extremely low temperatures that could 
 
27 Cadie Thompson, The Future of Medicine Means Part Human, Part Computer, 
CNBC (Dec. 24, 2013, 8:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2013/12/23/the-future-of-
medicine-means-part-human-part-computer.html (reporting that a top health 
technology researcher expects that in a decade “one-third of the population will  
have either a temporary device or another more permanent connected device in  
their body”). 
28 Connected Home – Internet of Things, AMAZON WEB SERVS., 
https://aws.amazon.com/iot/solutions/connected-home/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). 
29 See All Things Alexa: Alexa Features, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/b/ 
ref=gbpp_itr_m-2_5fb2_16067214?node=16067214011&ie=UTF8 (last visited Oct. 
14, 2018). 
30 Alexa Features: Using Multiple Devices with Alexa, AMAZON, 
https://www.amazon.com/b/ref=aeg_lp_mdh_d/ref=s9_acss_bw_cg_aegflp_7c1_w?nod
e=17934691011&pf (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). 
31 See Family Hub, SAMSUNG, https://www.samsung.com/us/explore/family-hub-
refrigerator/connected-hub/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Google Nest Learning Thermostat, GOOGLE, https://nest.com/thermostats/ 
nest-learning-thermostat/overview/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). 
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cause pipes to burst.35  Examples of the final category of home 
appliance—home networking devices—include WiFi and Cable 
TV boxes.  These boxes can automatically send diagnostic reports 
to customer service and allow consumers to monitor their 
network connectivity through a mobile application.36  Experts at 
Amazon anticipate the rate of growth of home appliances to be 
18.5% annually.37  The experts expect an increase from 433 
million shipped devices in 2016 to 940 million shipped devices in 
2022.38 
3. Automobile Sensors 
Two common types of automobile sensors are Event Data 
Recorders (“EDRs”) and auto insurance telematics devices.39  
EDRs are “devices[s] installed in . . .  motor vehicle[s] to record 
technical vehicle and occupant information for a brief period of 
time (seconds, not minutes) before, during[,] and after a crash.”40  
EDRs collect vehicle data to identify auto safety issues and 
ultimately improve road safety.41  While vehicles are not required 
to have EDRs, if a manufacturer voluntarily includes them, 
federal regulations regulate what categories of data must be 
collected.42  Even though EDRs are not mandatory, the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimated that 96% of 
new vehicles have them because of the benefit they provide to 
motor vehicle safety.43  Additionally, manufacturers can use the 
data collected after vehicle accidents to improve the safety of the 
cars. 
 
 
35 Id. 
36 Connected Home – Internet of Things, supra note 28. 
37 Home of the Future: Building a Connected Home with AWS IoT, AMAZON  
WEB SERVICES, https://d1.awsstatic.com/product-marketing/iot/AWS-IoT-Connected-
Home-Infographic.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2019). 
38 Id. 
39 Peppet, supra note 15, at 104. 
40 Event Data Recorder, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/research-data/event-data-recorder (last visited Sept. 1, 2019) 
(“EDRs may record (1) pre-crash vehicle dynamics and system status, (2) driver 
inputs, (3) vehicle crash signature, (4) restraint usage/deployment status, and 
(5) post-crash data such as the activation of an automatic collision notification 
(ACN) system.”). 
41 Id. 
42 See 49 C.F.R. § 563.3 (2019). 
43 Peppet, supra note 15, at 104. 
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Moreover, auto-insurance companies have begun using 
internet-connected telematic devices, also called usage-based 
insurance (“UBI”), to track how safely consumers drive.44  The 
insurance companies then use the data collected to set insurance 
premiums for consumers.45  The devices usually measure a 
number of data points such as: “miles driven; time of day; where 
the vehicle is driven (Global Positioning System or GPS); rapid 
acceleration; hard braking; hard cornering; and air bag 
deployment.”46  Progressive, a large auto insurance company, 
uses a UBI device called Snapshot to determine insurance rates 
based on how the customer drives.47  They boast that this 
technology can save consumers an average of $130 on their 
insurance premiums.48 
4. Employee Sensors 
A final area of IoT devices is workplace sensors that monitor 
an employee’s performance and activity.49  Commonly used IoT 
devices in the workplace include sensors on package delivery 
trucks, health and wellness apps, and devices that track 
employee behavior.50  Examples of the latter category include a 
performance monitor used by Bank of America and an activity 
monitor called Biovigil.51  Bank of America used wearable sensors 
developed by Ben Waber, president of Sociometric Solutions, on 
call center employees to study why different call centers had 
 
44 Sarwant Singh, The Future of Car Insurance: Digital, Predictive and 
Usage-Based, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarwantsingh/ 
2017/02/24/the-future-of-car-insurance-digital-predictive-and-usage-based/#425849 
3152fb. 
45 Id. 
46 Usage-Based Insurance and Telematics, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS, 
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_usage_based_insurance.htm (last updated 
May 17, 2019). 
47 Snapshot, PROGRESSIVE, https://www.progressive.com/auto/discounts/ 
snapshot/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). 
48 Id. 
49 Peppet, supra note 15, at 112. 
50 Josh Bersin et al., Will IoT Technology Bring Us the Quantified Employee?: 
The Internet of Things in Human Resources, DELOITTE (May 24, 2016), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/focus/internet-of-things/people-analytics-
iot-human-resources.html#endnote-sup-11. 
51 Vivian Giang, Companies Are Putting Sensors on Employees To  
Track Their Every Move, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 14, 2013, 6:23 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/tracking-employees-with-productivity-sensors-
2013-3; BIOVIGIL, http://biovigil.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). It should be noted 
that BioVigil was originally called HyGreen. 
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different levels of employee productivity.52  The devices recorded 
the employees’ tone of voice, speaking speed, and speaking 
volume to determine the nature of people’s conversations and 
stress levels.53  Based on the study, Bank of America concluded 
that employees are more productive when they take breaks at the 
same time and, thus, have time to socialize.54  Using this 
information, Bank of America changed its break schedule and 
increased employee productivity by 10%.55 
Another example of connected employee monitoring devices 
is the BioVigil hand hygiene system used in many healthcare 
facilities.56  In hospitals that use the device, health care workers 
wear badges that connect, via the internet, with hand-washing 
sensors that detect when it is time for a hospital employee to 
wash her hands.57  Then, the system records the event so that the 
hospital can track and review its employees.58  Any time 
healthcare workers should have washed their hands but did not, 
the badge turns red to remind employees to do so.59  Biovigil 
claims that its device has led to a reduction in medical staff 
absenteeism by 18%.60  More importantly, Biovigil claims that it 
has led to an 83% reduction in hospital-acquired infections.61 
II. WHY REGULATION OF IOT DEVICES IS NECESSARY 
The above descriptions of IoT devices demonstrate that these 
devices have infiltrated almost every aspect of our daily lives.  
And, because of the indispensable benefits they provide, it is 
unlikely that we will discontinue their use.  In fact, it is likely 
that the number and potential uses of IoT devices will continue 
to grow.  Due to the increasing prevalence of these devices in our 
lives, it is important to enact legislation that protects consumers 
from the risks associated with large amounts of data collection 
while still allowing for technological advancement.  The more IoT 
 
52 Giang, supra note 51. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 BIOVIGIL, supra note 51. 
57 BioVigil, BioVigil in Action, YOUTUBE (July 11, 2018), https://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=0EhEqKuHY8Q&feature=youtu.be. 
58 BIOVIGIL, supra note 51. 
59 BIOVIGIL, supra note 57. 
60 BIOVIGIL, supra note 51 
61 Id. 
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devices used, the higher the risk of the misuse of data.  The FTC 
has split the risks associated with IoT devices into two 
categories: security risks and privacy risks.62 
A. Security Risks 
The primary security risks to consumers identified by 
participants in an FTC workshop are: “(1) enabling unauthorized 
access and misuse of personal information; (2) facilitating attacks 
on other systems; and (3) creating [physical] safety risks.”63 
1. Unauthorized Access to Data and Attacks on Other Systems 
The first two risks identified are closely aligned because they 
concern hackers or other unauthorized third parties that may 
take advantage of vulnerabilities in technology and the lack of 
regulation to gain access to personal data stored on IoT devices.  
Once accessed, hackers can then use personal data in 
inappropriate ways or to attack other systems and devices.64  
While these risks have been present for a long time in connection 
with computers and mobile phones, the impact of the risks will 
increase as the number of IoT devices increases.65 
An example of an instance where hackers took advantage of 
the vulnerabilities in technology is United States v. Vtech 
Electronics Limited.66  There, the FTC sued Vtech, the 
manufacturer of an electronic toy and corresponding application 
called Kid Connect, for failing to comply with the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”).67  Vtech developed a 
program in which parents could set up an account for their child 
by providing the child’s name, date of birth, gender, and a profile 
 
62 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 10. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 11. 
65 ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, Comments of the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center to the Federal Trade Commission: On the Privacy and Security 
Implications of the Internet of Things, at 16 (June 1, 2013) https://www.epic.org/apa/ 
comments/EPIC-FTC-IoT-Cmts.pdf [hereinafter EPIC] (“[M]any of the same data 
security risks that currently threaten our data will only expand in the Internet of 
Things.”); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 11 (“[A]s consumers install 
more smart devices in their homes, they may increase the number of vulnerabilities 
an intruder could use to compromise personal information.”). 
66 Complaint at 1, United States v. Vtech Elecs. Ltd., No. 1:18-cv-114 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Vtech Elecs.]. 
67 Id. at 1. 
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picture.68  Once registered, the children could use the chat 
function to communicate with each other and even send pictures 
and audio messages.69  In 2015, hackers were able to acces the 
information of both the parents and the children even though it 
had been encrypted because the database included the decryption 
keys, so the hackers could view the data in a readable format.70  
Due to the nature of the information collected, “if a child had 
submitted a photo through Kid Connect, the hacker could have 
found the photo, along with [the] physical address” of the 
family.71 
Another alarming example of hackers accessing IoT devices 
is In the Matter of TRENDnet, Inc.72  There, the FTC sued 
TRENDnet, the manufacturer of Internet Protocol cameras, for 
violating the Federal Trade Commission Act (the “FTC Act”).73  
The cameras allow consumers to monitor their homes or 
businesses over the internet by accessing live video and audio 
feeds.74  In 2012, hackers were able to access the live feeds and 
obtain the IP addresses of hundreds of consumers.75  The hackers 
then posted links to the live feeds of almost 700 cameras.76  The 
feeds “displayed private areas of users’ homes and allowed the 
unauthorized surveillance of infants sleeping in their cribs, 
young children playing, and adults engaging in typical daily 
activities.”77 
 
68 Id. at 4. 
69 Id. at 5. 
70 Id. at 8–9. 
71 Id. at 9. 
72 Complaint, In re TRENDnet, Inc., No. C-4426 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014), 2014 WL 
556262. This matter was settled in 2014. See FTC Approves Final Order Settling 
Charges Against TRENDnet, Inc., FTC (February 7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2014/02/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-against-
trendnet-inc. TRENDnet is prohibited from misrepresenting the security of its 
products. Id. It was also required to improve its secuirty program and notify 
customers of the prior security issues. Id. 
73 Id. at 1. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 3. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. It is important to note that TRENDnet is not the only video camera 
company that has had these issues. Parents in Ohio, using a camera manufactured 
by Foscam, woke up to “the sound of a man shouting, ‘Wake up, baby!’ ” from a man 
who was watching their child sleep. Home, Hacked Home: The Perils of Connected 
Devices, supra note 1. “The problem arose even though Foscam had taken all the 
right steps in response to the initial breach, which shows how hard it is to protect 
devices hooked up to the internet.” Id. 
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2. Physical Safety Risks 
Even more unsettling than the exposure of personal data are 
the risks to a consumer’s physical safety.  Physical safety risks 
manifest in two ways.  First, hackers can physically threaten 
consumers by analyzing data from their devices to further the 
commission of a crime.  An example of this situation would be 
where a hacker monitors a consumer’s IoT devices to determine 
whether that person is home and then uses that data to commit a 
burglary.78  Second, hackers can cause direct physical harm to 
consumers by accessing and controlling their devices—for 
example, where a person hacks into the telematic device of a 
consumer’s car and takes control of the engine and brakes.79 
One particularly disturbing possibility is a hacker accessing 
a person’s IoT medical device to obstruct its beneficial purpose.  
For example, Jerome Radcliffe, a researcher, demonstrated that 
hackers could access insulin pumps to control the amount of 
insulin distributed to diabetics.80  He explained that a hacker 
could cause the device to display a higher blood sugar level than 
actually exists, meaning that “[a] diabetic could be manipulated 
into administering more insulin then [sic] needed, potentially 
causing a hypoglycemic condition.”81  If it is possible for hackers 
to access insulin pumps, it is easy to imagine that it would be 
possible for hackers to access other medical devices, such as 
pacemakers.82 
B. Privacy Risks 
When the FTC conducted a workshop on the IoT, 
participants outlined several privacy risks associated with IoT 
devices.  These included the “collection of sensitive personal 
 
78 EPIC, supra note 65, at 16–17; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 
13 (“[A] thief could remotely access data about energy usage from smart meters to 
determine whether a homeowner is away from home.”). 
79 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 12–13 (“Although the risks [of hacking 
into cars] currently may be small, they could be amplified as fully automated cars, 
and other automated physical objects, become more prevalent.”). 
80 Jerome Radcliffe, Hacking Medical Devices for Fun and Insulin: Breaking the 
Human SCADA System, at 1, https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-11/Radcliffe/BH_ 
US_11_Radcliffe_Hacking_Medical_Devices_WP.pdf. 
81 Id. 
82 Adrian Baranchuk et al., Cybersecurity for Cardiac Implantable Electronic 
Devices: What Should You Know?, 71 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1284, 1284 (2018) 
(discussing the “relatively new threat in light of recent incidents involving the 
potential for hacking of cardiac devices”). 
862	 ST.	JOHN’S	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	93:851			
information, such as precise geolocation, financial account 
numbers, or health information.”83  These privacy risks are 
further exacerbated by the fact that data collected across 
numerous IoT devices for a single person could facilitate the 
drawing of inferences about that person’s behavior patterns.84 
1. Collection of Sensitive Personal Information 
The collection of sensitive personal information from smart 
devices could reveal “information with potential for commercial 
value.”85  If third parties have access to this kind of information, 
it “could lead to the commercialization of intimate segments of 
consumers’ lives.”86  For example, in FTC v. Vizio, Inc., the 
Commission sued the television manufacturer Vizio under the 
FTC Act for selling consumers’ data to third parties without 
consent.87  Vizio collected “second-by-second information about 
video displayed on the smart TV” and “append[ed] specific 
demographic information to the viewing data, such as sex, age, 
income, marital status, household size, education level, home 
ownership, and household value.”88  Vizio then sold this 
information to third parties for the purpose of measuring 
audiences, analyzing advertisement effectiveness, and targeting 
advertising to particular consumers.89 
Smart TV manufacturers are not the only companies that 
have sold consumer data to third parties.90  As a result, data 
collection could lead to a greater power imbalance between 
 
83 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 14. 
84 EPIC, supra note 65, at 10 (“One of the primary risks that internet users will 
face as the Internet of Things expands is the fact that the ubiquitous collection and 
storage of data about users can reveal sensitive behavior patterns.”). 
85 Id. at 12 (“Smart devices could reveal a wealth of information about 
consumers’ location, media consumption, activity patterns, associations, lifestyle, 
age, income, gender, race and health . . . .”). 
86 Id. 
87 Complaint at 1, FTC v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00758 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2017) 
[hereinafter Vizio Complaint]. 
88 FTC, Vizio to pay $2.2 Million to FTC, State of New Jersey To Settle Charges 
It Collected Viewing Histories on 11 Million Smart Televisions Without Users’ 
Consent, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2017/02/vizio-pay-22-million-ftc-state-new-jersey-settle-charges-it 
[hereinafter Vizio]. 
89 Vizio, supra note 88. 
90 EPIC, supra note 65, at 12–13 (noting that General Motors, Verizon, and 
Internet providers can or already have provided consumer data to third parties). 
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consumers and corporations.91  The more information a company 
has about consumers, the more power the company has over 
them because they have an increased “ability to influence or 
direct the behavior of consumers.”92  Examples of where this 
might occur are insurance companies, like Progressive, that use 
EDRs to determine insurance premiums based on driving 
behavior, or rental car companies that use EDRs to “charge 
numerous ‘gotcha fees’ for driving outside of specified regions or 
using certain services.”93  As a result, companies that provide 
important services leave consumers “relatively disempowered 
and without meaningful choice.”94  For many important services, 
such as phone service, consumers can choose from only a limited 
number of companies, which provide long, form contracts that 
are dictated by the companies.95  If consumers do not have a 
meaningful choice to choose a service provider, they are 
essentially forced to agree to the terms of a contract without the 
ability to protect themselves from unwanted data collection. 
2. Behavioral Pattern Inferences 
The immense volume of data collected across various IoT 
devices allows those with access to that data to analyze it and 
make inferences.96  One participant in the IoT workshop noted 
that one data point is generated every six seconds in households 
that use his company’s product, or 150 million data points daily 
for 10,000 consumers collectively.97  These data points can 
contain sensitive personal information, such as “precise 
geolocation, financial account numbers, or health information.”98  
However, the data points can also include “personal information, 
habits, locations, and physical conditions over time.”99  Then, 
 
91 Id. at 13. 
92 Id. at 14 (“Information is power, and smart devices will provide much more 
information about consumers’ behavior to companies than has been traditionally 
available.”). 
93 Id. at 15. 
94 Id. at 13; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN 
AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 
51 (2012) (“[A] ‘take it or leave it’ approach is problematic from a privacy 
perspective, in markets for important services where consumers have few options.”). 
95 EPIC, supra note 65, at 13. 
96 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 15. 
97 Id. at 14. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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these data points can be “used to infer a user’s mood; stress 
levels; personality type; bipolar disorder; demographics (e.g., 
gender, marital status, job status, age); smoking habits; [and] 
overall well-being.”100  These inferences could be used to “make 
credit, insurance, and employment decisions.”101 
An example of a device that could facilitate this amount of 
data collection is the Smart Grid.  The United States is currently 
moving towards switching over utilities to a smart grid system.102  
A smart grid “will be capable of monitoring everything from 
power plants to customer preferences to individual appliances.”103  
This technology has many indispensable benefits for the 
economy, such as integrating alternative energy sources like 
solar and wind power, enabling electric vehicles, allowing for 
large-sale storage, and enabling the use of green buildings.104  At 
the same time, this technology creates serious privacy risks 
because “[i]nformation about a power consumer’s schedule can 
reveal intimate, personal details about their lives, such as their 
medical needs, interaction with others, and personal habits.”105  
In order for such important technology to be successfully 
integrated into our economy, we must first enact legislation to 
protect the public from misuses of data. 
III. CURRENT LEGISLATION AVAILABLE 
Despite the growing privacy and security risks associated 
with the IoT, there are currently no IoT-specific regulations on 
the federal level.  In fact, in 2013, the FTC conducted a workshop 
where they stated that such legislation was not necessary at the 
time.106  Since then, California has enacted two important pieces 
 
100 Id. at 15. 
101 Id. 
102 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE SMART GRID: AN INTRODUCTION 2. 
103 Id. at 13. 
104 Id. at 15. 
105 EPIC, supra note 65, at 11; see also ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, 
OPINION 04/2013 ON THE DATA PROTECTION IMPACT ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE FOR 
SMART GRID AND SMART METERING SYSTEMS (‘DPIA TEMPLATE’) PREPARED BY 
EXPERT GROUP 2 OF THE COMMISSION’S SMART GRID TASK FORCE 5 (2013) 
[hereinafter DPIA TEMPLATE] (explaining that “[f]rom . . . the smart meters, a lot of 
information can be inferred regarding the consumers’ use of specific goods or devices, 
daily routines, living arrangements, activities, lifestyles and behaviour,” thus 
creating risks of “price discrimination, profiling for behavioural advertisement, 
taxation, law enforcement access, [and] household security”). 
106 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 2–3, 48. 
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of legislation that “represent a dramatic expansion of data 
privacy law that will impact the products and processes of many 
companies.”107  While the new California laws are not perfect to 
fix all the issues with data privacy, they are a good starting point 
that Congress should use as a model to enact federal level IoT 
legislation. 
A. FTC Recommendation 
After conducting a workshop on the IoT in 2013, the FTC 
published its recommendation on how to improve IoT security in 
2015.108  At the workshop, the FTC consulted the advice and 
opinions of many participants who noted the various security and 
privacy risks associated with the IoT. 
1. Description of the Provisions 
Most notably, the FTC noted that the “[s]taff does not believe 
that the privacy and security risks, though real, need to be 
addressed through IoT-specific legislation at this time.”109  The 
Commission reasoned that “legislation aimed specifically at the 
IoT at this stage would be premature” because of the “great 
potential for innovation.”110  Instead, the Commission 
recommended that companies take a self-regulatory approach 
and adopt best practices concerning “data security, data 
minimization, and notice and choice.”111  Additionally, the 
Commission urged Congress to “enact strong, flexible, and 
technology-neutral legislation to strengthen the Commission’s 
existing data security enforcement tools and require companies 
to notify consumers when there is a security breach.”112 
In the meantime, the Commission stated that it will rely on 
existing laws to hold IoT companies liable for any harm to 
consumers.113  These laws include the FTC Act, the Fair Credit 
 
107 New California Security of Connected Devices Law and CCPA Amendments, 
GIBSON DUNN (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/new-california-security-
of-connected-devices-law-and-ccpa-amendments/. In 2018, California passed the 
California Consumer Privacy Act and a new law that specifically regulates internet 
connected devices. Id. Both laws went into effect on January 1, 2020. Id. 
108 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 48–53. 
109 Id. at 48. 
110 Id. at 49. 
111 Id. at 27. 
112 Id. at 49 (emphasis added). 
113 Id. at 53. 
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Reporting Act (“FCRA”), COPPA, and “the health breach 
notification provisions” of the Health Information Technology for 
Economic Clinical Health Act (“HI-TECH Act”).114  The 
Commission also stated that it will educate consumers and 
businesses on how to protect themselves, work with groups to 
consider “guidelines related to the Internet of Things,” and 
advocate for courts and other agencies to “promote protections in 
this area.”115 
2. Issues with the FTC Recommendation 
Even though the FTC determined in 2015 that enacting IoT-
specific legislation was too premature—given the growing 
number IoT devices and the growing number of data breaches 
and harms to consumers—it is no longer premature to enact this 
kind of legislation.  In 2018, the Identity Theft Resource Center 
published a study showing that the total number of data 
breaches has doubled since 2015.116  The main problem with the 
FTC’s recommendation for IoT security is that the existing laws 
that it plans to rely on protect consumers only to a limited 
extent.117  An IoT specific law is needed to address the gaps in the 
FTC Act, FCRA, COPPA, and the HI-TECH Act. 
a. FTC Act 
Specifically, the FTC recommends relying on § 5 of the FTC 
Act for “[u]nfair methods of competition.”118  This section declares 
that the “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce” are unlawful.119  Additionally, the Act only permits 
the FTC to bring an action against “persons, partnerships, or 
corporations” that are in violation of the Act.120  Private citizens 
have no right to bring a claim, meaning that consumers must 
 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 See ITRC Data Breach Overview 2005 to 2017, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE 
CTR. (2018), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/Overview20052017.pdf 
(showing that the number of data breaches in 2015 was 780, while the number of 
data breaches in 2017 was 1,579). 
117 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 53. 
118 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. § (a)(2). 
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rely on the “FTC’s willingness to act.”121  The primary issue with 
relying on the FTC Act for IoT-related security issues is that it 
does not afford consumers a private right of action.  Furthermore, 
it fails to protect consumers against situations in which a party 
did not act unfairly or deceptively, yet the consumer is still 
injured.  For example, if a manufacturer is merely negligent in 
its privacy protocols and a consumer is injured, the consumer 
would not have a private right of action against the 
manufacturer. 
It may be argued that while there is not a private right of 
action in the FTC Act, every state has enacted its own Unfair and 
Deceptive Acts and Practices statute (“UDAP”) which provides 
consumers with a private right of action.122  While this is true, 
these statutes vary widely in terms of their strength.123  For 
example, a few states have civil penalty maximums of $1,000, 
while others have civil penalty maximums as high as $50,000.124  
Furthermore, states vary in the scope of their coverage.125  While 
some states offer strong protections for credit and insurance 
issues, other states provide relatively weak protections.126  Given 
the fact that IoT-related privacy and security risks tend to span 
across states, it would be more efficient if consumers could bring 
claims in federal court, under a uniform law where they could 
receive similar remedies for similar injuries. 
b. FCRA 
Even though the FTC has yet to bring an IoT claim under 
the FCRA, the Commission still recommends its use to protect 
against IoT security and privacy risks.  However, the FCRA is 
insufficient for this purpose because it is limited in scope and 
would apply to few IoT-related cases.  The purpose of the FCRA 
 
121 Id.; see also Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions 
Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade 
Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 523 (1980). 
122 Unfair & Deceptive Acts & Practices, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., 
https://www.nclc.org/issues/unfair-a-deceptive-acts-a-practices.html (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2019). 
123 CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN 
THE STATES: A 50-STATE EVALUATION OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES LAWS 9 
(2018). 
124 Id. at 2. 
125 See id. at 5-8. 
126 Id. at 5 (showing that Alabama offers strong credit and insurance protections 
and that Arizona offers weak credit and insurance protections). 
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is “to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable 
procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer 
credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner 
which is fair and equitable.”127  One application of this Act is to 
“third-party consumer reports used for credit or employment 
purposes.”128  Generally, this Act does not apply to the parties 
that first collect the data.129  In other words, the Act would not 
“cover IoT device manufacturers that do their own in-house 
analytics” or “companies that collect data directly from 
consumers’ connected devices and use the data to make in-house 
credit, insurance, or other eligibility decisions.”130  For example, 
car insurance companies, like Progressive, could use UBI devices 
to collect data about consumers, and use that data to make 
insurance decisions without risk of violating FCRA.131 
c. COPPA 
COPPA is similar to the FTC Act in that it “prohibits unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in connection with the collection, 
use, and/or disclosure of personal information from and about 
children on the Internet.”132  Some notable differences are that 
COPPA applies only to children under the age of thirteen133 and 
states that any collection of a child’s personal information 
requires parental consent.134  The most important difference is 
that COPPA requires companies that collect personal 
information from children to “maintain reasonable procedures to 
protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity” of the 
information.135 
For example, in the Vtech case, the Commission used COPPA 
to hold a toy manufacturer liable when hackers were able  
to access children’s information.136  One of the counts of the 
 
127 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2018). 
128 Katherine Britton, IoT Big Data: Consumer Wearables, Data Privacy and 
Security, AM. B. ASS’N. (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/ 
landslide/2015-16/november-december/IoT-Big-Data-Consumer-Wearables-Data-
Privacy-Security/. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Snapshot, supra note 47. 
132 FTC Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.1 (2013). 
133 § 312.2. 
134 § 312.5(a). 
135 § 312.8. 
136 See Vtech Elecs., supra note 66, at 1–2, 9–10. 
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complaint alleged that the company violated the Act because of 
its failure to maintain reasonable security measures to protect 
the children’s information.137  While COPPA is limited because it 
only applies to information of children under the age of thirteen, 
a provision requiring reasonable security measures for people of 
all ages would better help to protect consumers than the 
currently available federal laws. 
d. HI-TECH Act 
Finally, the FTC recommends reliance on the health breach 
notification portion of the HI-TECH Act.  This section of the 
HI-TECH Act provides that entities that keep consumers’ health 
information should “notify each individual whose unsecured 
protected health information has been, or is reasonably believed 
by the covered entity to have been, accessed, acquired, or 
disclosed as a result” of breach of such information.138  Data 
breach notification laws of this kind generally serve two 
purposes: to “recognize that an individual has a ‘right to know’ 
about unauthorized misuse of his or her personal information 
and notice of the incident enables mitigation of subsequent 
identity theft”; and to “encourage organizations to adopt better 
security practices” because of the negative reputational effects of 
reporting a data breach.139  While this law is helpful in 
encouraging companies to increase security measures, it is not 
enough to remedy IoT security issues because it is primarily a 
retroactive provision that does not actually prevent data 
breaches in the first place.140  Furthermore, it only applies to 
health data, so it does not provide a remedy for another kind of 
data breach. 
 
137 Id. at 10. 
138 42 U.S.C. § 17932(a) (2018). 
139 Mark Burdon, Contextualizing the Tensions and Weaknesses of Information 
Privacy and Data Breach Notification Laws, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 63, 78–79 (2011). 
140 Id. at 126 (“[Data breach notification] laws should not be viewed as a ‘be all 
end all’ solution to problems relating to the inadequate protection of personal 
information by corporations. Data breach notification laws are extremely useful at 
highlighting problems but that does not mean they necessarily have the regulatory 
tools to remedy the problems that they uncover.”). 
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B. California Consumer Privacy Act and Connected Devices Bill 
The California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) was 
approved by the Governor on June 28, 2018, and went into effect 
on January 1, 2020.141  The bill was passed in part as a response 
to the Cambridge Analytica scandal in which millions of people’s 
personal information was misused.142  The scandal, along with 
the increase in personal consumer data,143 caused the California 
legislature to realize that it has “not kept pace with” the 
developments in the collection of personal information.144  The 
aim of the bill is to further the right to privacy by “giving 
consumers an effective way to control their personal 
information.”145  While the CCPA and the Connected Devices Act, 
discussed below, are not perfect, they are a model that Congress 
could look to in crafting specific IoT regulations. 
1. Provisions of the CCPA 
The CCPA grants consumers the following rights: (1) “to 
know what personal information is being collected”; (2) “to know 
whether their personal information is sold or disclosed and to 
whom”; (3) “to say no to the sale of personal information”; (4) “to 
access their personal information”; and (5) “to equal service and 
price, even if they exercise their privacy rights” under this Act.146  
The CCPA defines personal information as “information that 
identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated 
with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a 
particular consumer or household.”147  It applies to any business 
that meets one of the following characteristics: (1) “[h]as annual 
gross revenues in excess of twenty-five million dollars”; 
(2) receives “the personal information of 50,000 or more 
consumers”; or (3) “[d]erives 50 percent or more of its annual 
 
141 Assemb. B. 375, Ch. 55, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
142 § 2(g). 
143 § 2(c) (“It is almost impossible to apply for a job, raise a child, drive a car, or 
make an appointment without sharing personal information.”). 
144 § 2(d). “The unauthorized disclosure of personal information and the loss of 
privacy can have devasting effects for individuals . . . .” § 2(f). 
145 § 2(i). 
146 Id. 
147 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West, Westlaw current through urgency 
legis. through Ch. 40 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.) (effective Jan. 1, 2020). 
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revenues from selling” personal information.148  Additionally, the 
CCPA does not apply to “personal information if every aspect of 
that commercial conduct takes place wholly outside of 
California.”149 
For the most part, the CCPA does not provide a private right 
of action.  Instead, most violations can be pursued only by the 
attorney general.150  However, there is one exception where a 
consumer has a “private right of action in connection  
with . . . a consumer’s nonencrypted or nonredacted personal 
information.”151  Notably, the law does not restrict businesses in 
regard to “information that is deidentified or in the aggregate 
consumer information.”152 
2. Provisions of the Connected Devices Act 
On September 28, 2018, the California Governor approved of 
the Connected Devices Act that took effect on January 1, 2020.153  
The Connected Devices Act goes one step further than the CCPA 
and provides that a manufacturer of a device that connects to the 
internet should be equipped “with a reasonable security feature” 
that protects “any information contained therein from 
unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or 
disclosure.”154  Similar to the CCPA, this law does not provide 
consumers with a private right of action.155  Notably, the bill does 
 
148 Id. § 1798.140(c)(1)(A)–(C); see also Eric Goldman, An Introduction to the 
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) 2, (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies 
Research Paper, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3211013 
(“The IAPP conservatively estimated that over a half-million businesses are 
regulated by the law, ‘the vast majority of which are small- to medium-sized 
enterprises.’ ”). 
149 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(a)(6) (effective Jan. 1, 2020) (“[C]ommercial 
conduct takes place wholly outside of California if the business collected that 
information while the consumer was outside of California, no part of the sale of the 
consumer’s personal information occurred in California, and no personal information 
collected while the consumer was in California is sold.”). 
150 Assemb. B. 375, Ch. 55, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
151 Id. 
152 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(a)(5). “ ‘Deidentified’ means information that 
cannot reasonably identify . . . a particular consumer . . . .” § 1798.140(h). 
“ ‘Aggregate consumer information’ means information that relates to a group or 
category of consumers, from which individual consumer identities have been 
removed . . . .” § 1798.140(a). 
153 S.B. 327, Ch. 886, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
154 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.91.04(a)(3) (West, Westlaw current with urgency 
legis. through Ch. 40 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.) (effective Jan. 1, 2020). 
155 § 1798.91.06(e). 
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not provide a specific definition for “reasonable” security 
measures.  However, the Connected Devices Act does specify that 
the reasonable security provision will be met “if a connected 
device is equipped with a means for authentication outside a 
local area network . . . if either of the following requirements are 
met: (1) The preprogrammed password is unique to each device 
manufactured”; or “(2) The device contains a security feature that 
requires a user to generate a new means of authentication before 
access is granted to the device for the first time.”156 
3. Issues with CCPA and the Connected Devices Act 
Taken together, the CCPA and the Connected Devices Act 
take important steps to further the protection of consumers 
against the security and privacy risks associated with the IoT.  In 
crafting a federal-level statute, these acts could be models for 
Congress with regard to the reasonable security feature 
provision, and in some reliance on notice and consent.  However, 
there are three main issues with these California statutes that 
should be addressed: (1)  the CCPA does not apply to 
de-identified data; (2) the CCPA places too much emphasis on the 
role of the consumer and on notice and consent by the 
manufacturer; and (3) neither the CCPA nor the Connected 
Devices Act provides a private right of action for the consumer. 
a. De-identification 
The CCPA expressly does not extend to information that has 
been de-identified.157  De-identified data refer to data in which 
“all explicit identifiers” have been removed, “such as name, 
address, and phone number,” so that the data collected cannot be 
identified and attributed to a specific person.158  The issue with 
excluding de-identified data from protection is that the excluded 
data are fairly easy to re-identify with only a few specific data 
points.159 
 
 
156 § 1798.91.04(b). 
157 § 1798.145(a)(5). 
158 Latayna Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely 2 
(Carnegie Mellon Univ., Data Privacy Working Paper No. 3, 2000), 
https://dataprivacylab.org/projects/identifiability/paper1.pdf. 
159 Id.; see also Peppet, supra note 15, at 129. 
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Numerous studies have emerged showing how easily data 
can be re-identified.  For example, in an important study by 
Latayna Sweeney in 2000, Sweeney discovered that 87% of the 
United States population could be identified by zip code, gender, 
and birth date alone.160  Sweeney was even able to track down the 
Massachusetts Governor’s hospital records with these data points 
and mailed them to him as proof of her theory.161  Furthermore, 
in 2006, AOL released the internet search histories of 657,000 
Americans after removing identifying information.162  However, it 
was quickly realized that individuals could be re-identified.163  
Bloggers were able to track down, among others, Thelma Arnold 
of Georgia based on her internet searches for landscapers, dog 
training tips, single men, and other queries.164  Similar to the 
AOL scandal, in 2006 Netflix “released one hundred million 
records revealing how nearly a half-million of its users had rated 
movies” as part of a contest.165  Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly 
Shmatikov used this Netflix data to show how easy it is to 
re-identify data.166  They were able to show that 64% of users 
could be re-identified by knowing two of their movie ratings and 
the dates that they were rated.167 
b. Notice and Consent 
The CCPA’s reliance on notice and consent is too heavy 
because it requires the consumer to learn about the privacy 
policies of the manufacturer and then take action if the policies 
are unsatisfactory.168  Notice and consent provisions can be 
important because they give consumers the opportunity to make 
informed decisions, particularly in situations concerning 
 
160 Sweeney, supra note 158. 
161 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure 
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1719–20 (2010). 
162 Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 
4417749, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/ 
technology/09aol.html; see also Ohm, supra note 161, at 1717 (explaining that AOL 
“suppressed any obviously identifying information such as AOL username and IP 
address” and “replaced these identifiers with unique identification numbers”). 
163 Barbaro & Zeller, Jr., supra note 162. 
164 Id. 
165 Ohm, supra note 161, at 1720. 
166 ARVIND NARAYANAN & VITALY SHMATIKOV, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, 
HOW TO BREAK ANONYMITY OF THE NETFLIX PRIZE DATASET 1 (2018). 
167 Id. at 2. 
168 It should be noted that the FTC report also suggests that the companies 
should rely on notice and consent. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 39. 
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sensitive information.169  But, while these provisions are a 
necessary component of consumer protection, they alone are not 
sufficient because they place too much emphasis on the actions of 
consumers rather than focus on preventing data breaches in the 
first place. 
A major problem with notice and consent provisions is that a 
majority of consumers do not read them.  In one study, 
researchers set up a fake social media website and participants 
were asked to register an account.170  In the process, participants 
were asked to agree to the terms and conditions.171  Researchers 
measured the amount of time users spent reading the policy and 
included two “gotcha clauses” to determine whether the 
participants actually read the policy.172  The first “gotcha clause” 
stated that the company website could transfer any information 
to third-parties.173  The second “gotcha clause” stated that “by 
agreeing . . . participants would give up their first-born child.”174  
The results showed that 96% of participants spent less than five 
minutes reading the policy, even though it was estimated to take 
half an hour.175  Additionally, 93% of participants agreed to the 
“gotcha clauses,” allowing the transfer of their information to 
third parties and giving up their first born child.176  This study 
 
169 Id. 
170 Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: 
Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking 
Services 6 (TPRC 44: The 44th Research Conference on Communication, Information 
& Internet Policy, 2016, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2757465. 
171 Id. at 2. 
172 Id. at 11–12. 
173 Id. at 11. 
174 Id. at 12. 
175 Id. at 16. For many popular apps and websites, reading the terms and 
conditions would take multiple hours, and, therefore, it would be unreasonable to 
expect consumers to read them. For example, it took one man eight hours and 
fifty-nine minutes to read the terms of use on Amazon. Johnny Lieu, Terms and 
Conditions Are Too long, Just Ask a Guy Who Read Amazon’s for 9 Hours, 
MASHABLE (Mar. 15, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/03/15/reading-amazons-
terms-conditions/#kabwyEF28Oq1. The Washington Post published a study showing 
that it takes 193 minutes to read the iTunes terms and conditions, 95 minutes to 
read the Candy Crush terms and conditions, and 117 minutes for LinkedIn’s. Rick 
Noack, How Long Would It Take To Read the Terms of Your Smartphone Apps? 
These Norwegians Tried It out, WASH. POST (May 28, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/05/28/how-long-would-it-
take-to-read-the-terms-of-your-smartphone-apps-these-norwegians-tried-it-
out/?utm_term=.ad8ebfceaeba. 
176 Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch, supra note 170, at 17. 
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illustrates that even though notice and consent provisions seem 
like a good idea, they are ineffective because consumers do not 
generally take advantage of the protections they provide.  
Because of the consumer apathy in this area, more emphasis 
should be placed on the actions of the manufacturers, rather than 
the actions of consumers to protect their privacy. 
c. Lack of A Private Right of Action 
The final issue with the CCPA and the Connected Devices 
Act is that neither one provides a private right of action for 
consumers.177  Without a private right of action, consumers must 
rely on the government to address the wrongs committed by IoT 
manufacturers. Additionally, any remedy ordered by the court 
would not always be paid directly to the consumer.  For example, 
in some of the cases described above, where consumers did not 
have a private right of action, they barely received any remedy 
for the breach of their sensitive information.  In In the matter of 
TRENDnet, where hackers accessed home security cameras, the 
only remedy offered to consumers was that the company had to 
notify any affected customers and aid them in disabling the 
cameras.178  Likewise, in Vizio and VTech, the parties sought 
monetary judgments, but those judgments were to be paid out to 
government agencies rather than consumers.179 
As with TRENDnet, Vizio, and Vtech, any claim brought 
under the CCPA is not likely to directly compensate the 
consumer.  Under the CCPA, any monetary judgment is to be 
paid to a “[c]onsumer [p]rivacy [f]und” and the money in the fund 
“shall be used exclusively to offset any costs incurred by the state 
courts and the Attorney General in connection with this title.”180 
 
177 Assemb. B. 375, Ch. 55, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). It should be noted 
that the FTC Act also does not provide a private right of action. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) 
(West, Westlaw current through P.L. 116-29). 
178 Complaint at 9–10, In re Trendnet, Inc., No. C-4426 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014), 
2014 WL 556262. 
179 Vizio Complaint, supra note 87, at 4; Vtech Electronics, supra note 66, at 12. 
180 CAL CIV. CODE § 1798.160 (West, Westlaw current with urgency legis. 
through Ch. 40 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.) (effective Jan. 1, 2020). 
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IV. RECOMMENDATION 
As it currently stands, there is no federal, IoT-specific 
regulation that adequately aims to protect consumers from the 
unique risks that IoT devices create.  IoT-specific legislation is 
needed because these “devices may be inherently vulnerable” to 
privacy and security risks.181  The sheer amount of data being 
collected, and the rapid growth of these devices creates risks that 
must be preemptively addressed to better protect consumers.  In 
2012, the White House published a report on ways to promote 
consumer data protection.182  The report promoted a “Consumer 
Privacy Bill of Rights” to advance the following objectives: 
“[i]ndividual [c]ontrol,” “[t]ransparency,” “[r]espect for [c]ontext,” 
“[s]ecurity,” “[a]ccess and [a]ccuracy,” “[f]ocused [c]ollection,” and 
“[a]ccountability.”183  The recommendation proscribed by this 
Note for consumer protection will also attempt to further those 
same objectives. 
While no single regulation available is enough on its own to 
sufficiently protect consumers, some of the laws described above 
contain types of provisions that could be effective in an 
IoT-specific law if they are combined into one regulation.  These 
include: (1) making the manufacturer responsible for installing 
reasonable security measures into the devices; (2) notice of and 
consent to the collection, use, and sale of personal data; (3) data 
breach notification laws; and (4) a private right of action.  
Additionally, one type of provision that is missing from these 
regulations that would be wise to include in a new IoT-specific 
regulation is use-constraints, or constraints on the way 
manufacturers use and store data. 
 
 
 
 
181 Peppet, supra note 15, at 135 (“[T]hese products are often manufactured by 
traditional consumer-goods makers rather than computer hardware or software 
firms. The engineers involved may therefore be relatively inexperienced with 
data-security issues, and the firms involved may place insufficient priority on 
security concerns.”).  
182 See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A 
NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING 
INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012). 
183 Id. at 1. 
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A. A Federal Regulation Should Combine the Following in an 
IOT-Specific Law: Reasonable Security Measures, Notice and 
Consent, Data Breach Notification, and a Private Right of 
Action 
Requiring companies to place reasonable security measures 
on IoT devices is important for two reasons.  First, it would 
prevent the misuse of personal data by manufacturers and 
unauthorized third parties.  Second, unlike notice and consent 
provisions,184 it places the burden of consumer protection on the 
companies who may not otherwise take the extra time and effort 
to do so.185  While the FTC and the White House maintain that 
the § 5 of the FTC Act requires IoT devices to maintain 
reasonable security measures,186 as discussed above, the FTC Act 
is insufficient on its own to protect consumers because it is 
limited in scope and does not provide a private right of action.187  
Creating a provision that specifically states that manufacturers 
of IoT devices must provide reasonable security measures to 
protect consumers’ data, like COPPA and the California 
Connected Devices Act, would promote both security interests 
and accountability, as recommended by the White House.188 
While the Connected Devices Act does not define what 
“reasonable security measures” means, the California 
Department of Justice published a Data Breach report in 2016 
that provided recommendations for technology companies on how 
to provide reasonable security measures.189  Some of the 
 
184 Because consumers are unlikely to pay close attention to notice and comment 
provisions, more emphasis should be placed on the actions of the manufacturers 
rather than relying on the actions of consumers to protect their own privacy. See 
supra Section III.B.3.b. 
185 See supra Section III.B.2. 
186 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 182, at 29 (“Enforcement actions by the 
FTC . . . have established that companies’ failures to adhere to voluntary privacy 
commitments, such as those stated in privacy policies, are actionable under the FTC 
Act’s . . . prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
supra note 94, at 29 (arguing that the FTC Act provides that companies must 
implement reasonable security measures). 
187 See supra Section III.A.2.a. 
188 See supra Section III.B.2.; THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 182, at 19, 21 
(“SECURITY: Consumers have a right to secure and responsible handling of 
personal data . . . . ACCOUNTABILITY: Consumers have a right to have personal 
data handled by companies with appropriate measures in place to assure they 
adhere to the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.”). 
189 KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA DATA BREACH 
REPORT 27–38 (2016). 
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recommendations the report proposes include: (1) a stronger 
authentication process for consumers to access devices that 
contain sensitive personal information, stronger than just a 
username and password combination; and (2) encrypting 
consumers’ personal information.190 
Furthermore, notice and consent may promote the control 
and transparency objectives set out by the White House’s 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.  Notice and consent are 
important because they offer consumers the option to be in 
control of their own information,191 and these provisions can also 
provide consumers with access to information so they can better 
understand what their data is being used for.192  However, as 
discussed earlier, notice and consent are inefficient on their own 
because consumers rarely take the time to read privacy policy 
statements.  Moreover, with regard to essential services, like 
phone services, consumers may not really have a meaningful 
choice since the privacy policies across phone companies tend to 
be similar.193  Therefore, notice and consent must be paired with 
other protections to be effective in protecting consumers. 
Additionally, data breach notification laws provide 
consumers with control and transparency because such laws give 
consumers an opportunity to take steps to protect themselves.  
For example, if credit card information is breached, a consumer 
could take steps to immediately cancel the card and order a new 
one before significant financial harm is inflicted.  Finally, a 
private right of action may permit consumers to hold companies 
accountable for failure to comply with IoT regulations without 
having to rely on the government to bring an action.194 
B. Use Constraints 
One area where the current legislation is lacking is in 
putting use constraints on IoT manufacturers.  Use constraints 
limit how manufacturers use and store sensitive data collected 
about consumers.  These constraints could address the final three 
 
190 Id. at v–vi. 
191 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 182, at 11 (“Individual Control: Consumers 
have a right to exercise control over what personal data companies collect from them 
and how they use it.”). 
192 Id. at 14 (“TRANSPARENCY: Consumers have a right to easily 
understandable and accessible information about privacy and security practices.”). 
193 See supra Section III.B.3.b. 
194 See supra Section III.B.3.c. 
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objectives set out by the White House: respect for context, access 
and accuracy, and focused collection.195  In a report by the FTC in 
2012, the Commission explained some types of use constraints 
that could be applied to data privacy protection, including 
limiting the type of data collected, disposing of any data collected 
after a certain time period, and ensuring that the data collected 
about a consumer is accurate.196 
If companies were to limit the type of data being collected to 
only data that is necessary to accomplish a goal that is 
reasonably related to the consumer’s use of the device, then it 
would serve both the “respect for context” and “focused collection” 
objectives.197  This limitation would also allow consumers to be 
more aware of what information is being collected since it would 
be information that consumers would reasonably expect to be 
collected.198  Additionally, limits on data collection could prevent 
discrimination based on harmful inferences that can be made 
from certain types of data.199  In its 2012 privacy report, the FTC 
provided an example of a company successfully limiting its data 
collection to that which is necessary.  Takers of the Graduate 
Management Admission Test (“GMAT”) became concerned about 
providing fingerprints to gain admission to the test because of 
the potential that they may be “cross-referenced against criminal 
databases.”200  GMAT responded to the concern by using palm 
prints to identify test-takers, rather than fingerprints.201  Palm 
prints are just as accurate as fingerprinting at identifying 
individuals, but they are less commonly used as identifiers, so 
there is less risk that they can be used as a cross reference in a 
criminal database.202 
 
195 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 182, at 1. 
196 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 94, at vii. 
197 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 182, at 15 (“RESPECT FOR CONTEXT: 
Consumers have a right to expect that companies will collect, use, and disclose 
personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in which consumers 
provide the data.”); id. at 21 (“FOCUSED COLLECTION: Consumers have a right to 
reasonable limits on the personal data that companies collect and retain.”).  
198 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 94, at 37. 
199 Peppet, supra note 15, at 90 (explaining that large amounts of data collection 
“are the grist for drawing revealing and often unexpected inferences about our 
habits, predilections, and personalities,” which can lead to discrimination). 
200 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 94, at 27. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. (noting that the counsel for the GMAT test “received a privacy innovation 
award for small businesses for its work in this area”). 
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Furthermore, requiring that companies dispose of data after 
a reasonable period of time serves the White House’s objective of 
respect for context and security.203  What qualifies as a 
reasonable amount of time would depend on the nature of the 
device and its expected use.  Disposal of data not only helps 
maintain the most recent, accurate consumer data but also 
significantly decreases the amount of data left vulnerable to 
misuse by unauthorized third parties. 
Finally, ensuring that data are accurate serves the White 
House’s objectives of access and accuracy.204  Inaccurate data 
could lead to incorrect inferences about a consumer, which in 
turn could harm consumers in matters of employment, insurance 
coverage, and more.205  As discussed above, the FCRA imposes 
accuracy requirements on companies, but it is limited in scope 
and does not apply to many IoT devices.206  The FTC notes that 
data used for different purposes could have different standards 
for accuracy.  For example, “[c]ompanies using data to make 
decisions about consumers’ eligibility for benefits should take 
much more robust measures to ensure accuracy” than “companies 
using data for marketing purposes.”207  Therefore, an IoT-specific 
regulation could require different standards for accuracy based 
on the sensitivity of the type of data collected or the vulnerability 
of the consumer concerning specific kinds of technology. 
CONCLUSION 
IoT devices are an ever-increasing force of nature in our 
daily lives.  They provide a multitude of essential benefits that 
we as a society have come to rely on.  Thus, IoT devices are likely 
to continue to become irreplaceable tools.  With the many 
benefits that these devices bring, they also bring a vast array of 
privacy and security issues that our society has not had to face 
until recently.  Because of the new and prevalent risks associated 
 
203 See supra notes 191, 200. 
204 THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 182, at 19 (“ACCESS AND ACCURACY: 
Consumers have a right to access and correct personal data in usable formats, in a 
manner that is appropriate to the sensitivity of the data and the risk of adverse 
consequence to consumers if the data is inaccurate.”). 
205 See supra Section II.B.2. For example, inaccurate information collected by 
usage-based insurance devices could cause consumers to pay more in insurance 
premiums. See supra Section I.B.3. 
206 See supra Section III.A.2.b. 
207 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 94, at 30. 
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with the IoT and because of the increasing harms to consumers, 
it is time for Congress to enact an IoT-specific data privacy and 
security law.  Some of the provisions that Congress should 
consider including in such a law are reasonable security 
measures, notice and consent, data breach notification, a private 
right of action, and constraints on the way that manufacturers 
use and store consumer data. 
 
